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RECOMMENDATION #4

Personnel in the Security Office duplicating the file and name check search activity of the Records Integration Division (RI) should be discontinued by the Security Office. In cases, however, where additional information is essential because of prior employment or sensitive information is required, representatives of the Security Office should be permitted to obtain the appropriate files from RI as well as information from the files of the Area Divisions which may aid in conducting the investigation.

SUPPLEMENTARY

The recommendation is made on page 19 of the Survey Report that the six to eight Security personnel engaged in this work be reassigned elsewhere.

ACTION

The arrangement with DD/P eliminates duplication of searches of RI files by Security Office personnel and personnel of the DD/P organization. In accordance with an agreement between the Deputy Director (Plans) and the Director of Security, searches of RI files for operational approvals are made by the interested division of DD/P. The Security Office searches RI files in cases of covert security approval.

The Security Office has not found it feasible to reduce Security Office personnel engaged in searching RI files because of staff employee cases, covert security clearance cases, covert security approval cases, and extraneous activities relating to the searching of RI files on behalf of other Federal agencies. The relatively small amount of man hours gained by the discontinuance of RI file searches in operational approval cases has been more than offset by the increased workload in other activities of the Security Support Division.

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RECOMMENDATION #6

The Deputy Director (Administration) and the Director of Security in coordination with the Deputy Director (Plans) should study the problem of emergency destruction and make recommendations to the DCI as to where responsibilities lie and how a flexible emergency program on a world-wide scope can be developed and implemented.

SUPPLEMENTARY

The text on pages 10 and 11 concerning the emergency destruction program contains the following statements:

- a. Responsibility for developing an overseas emergency destruction program has not been clearly assigned (p. 10, paragraph 2).
- b. Policy and program planning appear logically to be the responsibility of the Security Office (p. 10, paragraph 3).
- c. The Security Office should draft an emergency program (p. 10, paragraph 4).
- d. Attention should be paid to the development of sufficient and adequate devices and methods for the quick destruction of classified files and equipment (p. 10, paragraphs 5 and 6).

ACTION

The Director of Security does not agree that the Security Office should assume basic responsibility for the development of an overseas emergency destruction program, as may be inferred from the supplementary items taken from the text of the Survey Report. Since July 1953 the Emergency Planning Officer has been conferring with the DD/P component in the development of policy guidance governing emergency planning for overseas Field stations.

Appropriate instructions have been issued to the Field to cover planning for emergency evacuation and redeployment, including planning for emergency destruction of documents, in the overseas Field installations through the medium of Clandestine Services Instruction 230-80 and Clandestine Services Instruction 5-4. This office has been informed by representatives of PPC/DD/P that all of the country plans prepared by the overseas installations pursuant to these instructions now contain provisions for emergency planning as described above.

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RECOMMENDATION #6 (Continued)

With respect to devices for the quick destruction of classified files and equipment, the Inspection Staff of the Security Office has been working with TSS. Numerous devices and methods for the destruction of files have been explored, but as of the present time the problem has not been adequately solved. Continuing attention is being given to this problem.

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RECOMMENDATION #15

A new component should be created in the Special Security Division known as the Special Projects Branch, which would consolidate under one administrative head the Operations Support and Special Inquiry Desk, the Counter Intelligence Desk, and Labor Officer in the Operations Branch, and the Correspondents Section.

ACTION

This recommendation has been partially implemented on a tentative basis to reflect a recommendation which will appear in a report being prepared by the Management Staff. The changes will be formalized when the study has been issued and approved by the Deputy Director (Support).

An Operational Support Branch, however, has been set up. At the moment it includes Operations Support, Cover and Counter Intelligence. The Labor activity has been tentatively shifted to the Investigative Branch, and the Correspondents Section has been put into a new Correspondents and Records Branch of the Security Support Division in accordance with advance information on the pending Management Report.

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RECOMMENDATION #20-h

The Report recommends on page 19 that larger cars of the Pontiac or similar class of different colors be supplied to Field offices which have considerable territory to cover and numerous operational assignments to handle. The text infers that the exclusive use of black Fords and Chevrolets constitutes a security hazard.

ACTION

In consonance with the policy to reduce operating expenses where possible, and since Ford and Chevrolet cars are no longer considered "lightweight" and inferior in performance, this office believes such autos are adequate for Field office use. The last assignment of cars received under a purchase requisition were colors other than black, so this hazard has been eliminated. Care will be taken in the future to ensure that the standardization of security vehicles is not such as to constitute any hazard.

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RECOMMENDATION #20-1

Page 25, paragraph 8, states that "It was noted that the (Security) Division, while in possession of the needed raw material, did not keep compiled certain statistics which would appear to be highly essential from a security point-of-view." In this connection, the following were mentioned: "(a) the number of on-duty employees both in Washington and

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ACTION

The specific statistics mentioned in this recommendation will be maintained excepting item (c) above. This is considered impractical.

In view of the wide variety of statistics the Security Division is required to furnish over a period of time in connection with periodic reports, the operation of Executive Order 10450, etc., it is felt that we should strive mainly to maintain such "raw material" statistics as convenient for the compilation of almost any specific statistical data desired. To attempt to foresee all statistical needs would require an increase in Division personnel. The advisability of such increases is doubtful when considering their contribution to the security of the Agency.

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